Masterclass: Achieving innovation excellence (Part 3)

Dr. Peter Temes, Founder & President, ILO Institute

Transcript:

Peter Temes (00:09):

I am seeing some familiar faces and I'm seeing a few new folks. Let me take the opportunity to reintroduce myself and I'm going to repeat a little bit of what I did earlier this morning and then we'll have a real conversation. So I am Peter Temes. This is the organization that I started about 20 years ago and we are a membership organization. These are most of, but not quite all of our current members. We host round table discussions, usually 15 to 20 people in cities all over the US and in Europe every year about 40 times a year. And we're also actually leading a new initiative around decarbonization, which is something worth talking about. Very significant to the insurance sector. We just did a big project for travelers around that and there's going to be a lot of movement and a lot of money in that space to pay attention to. This is a very ugly looking list of engagements. We've had work we've done specifically in the insurance space focused on new technology and really this is our kind of sweet spot, not making the new technology work, but what does it mean once you put it in? How should your business model change? How should your organizational structure change? Where are the opportunities once you got the new thing working, how do you understand the best place to put it, how to continually learn from it, how to continuously improve it. So very much a strategy organization rather than a technology organization. So if you want to talk about any of these items like the history of AIG and how they pioneer data analytics and insurance lessons from Munich in terms of what the market doesn't know about what you can do using new technology and in general the prior worthlessness of cyber insurance and whether that might be changing, creating demographics of one. This is maybe the biggest interesting opportunity from our perspective in the insurance business now driven by technology to really understand the risk of one individual or one transaction or one client. And there's a lot to talk about there. I don't know if any of you are encountering proxy discrimination as an issue in consumer insurance in particular. It's something I find fascinating and got exposed to through work we were doing with New York Life, And I'll leave it at that. The key emerging technologies that our members are asking us to research and that we're talking a lot about are obviously large language models including chat, GPT. Very curious how many of you are engaging with how to use it, how to learn from it, the value and the risks. Computer vision is really interesting and computer vision intersects with virtually every other element of emerging technology and insurance in my opinion, because we can actually see stuff that happens. I mean almost anywhere from the satellite that can inspect the roof of your house relative to your insurance coverage to the satellite or the ring telephone that can actually show people entering or exiting your house or your business to the idea that the visual data that we can compute might or might not be true. If we can get that right, which isn't a question of how brilliantly we can do pattern recognition, that's a separate track. But a question of how reliable, what we see is you should see a real step forward in how we can understand risk and the better we understand risk, the better we can underwrite risk and the better we can underwrite risk, the more stuff we can do in the world because it becomes a little safer. We manage the cost of failure. As some of you have heard me say today already, the number one best practice for innovation in large organizations is to systematically lower the cost of failure, not to de-risk things, not always to externalize the cost of failure, but to systematically lower it. And the number one place to find zero cost of failure are experiments that you've already paid for but have not paid attention to. So having that view inside the firm is really, really important. I mentioned federated learning. We haven't talked much explicitly about blockchain. How many of you're paying close attention to what blockchain can do or should do in the insurance business? Yeah, a little bit. Oh, that's very interesting. So I'll tell you in 2013, which is many years ago in the blockchain years, AIG asked us to do a study of blocks of not blockchain, but bitcoin. And I will admit to you, I believe the word blockchain was first used in 2009 or 2010. So in 2013, I executed this whole report, and didn't know what blockchain was at the end of it. I mean I hadn't come across it. No one was talking about it, at least in our research set. But what we were able thank goodness to recommend was, okay, Bitcoin not a good idea for a global 2000 insurance company. Lots of nasty business built into its heart. However, with any radically new technology, anything destabilizing and threatening, don't look at the bullseye, look at the ecosystem around it. And I'm glad we said that because it took years for me to realize, oh, that meant blockchain. Blockchain is so powerfully important because it's about having the opportunity to say, this is my personal guarantee of something that happened in an agreement I've made and this is the counterparties and it could be a hundred or a thousand counterparties. And that becomes, it's not so much the source of truth, it's the source of agreement. So I spent a lot of years as an academic and when I would apply to a faculty job for years, I had to go to a hundred and 16th Street and Broadway in New York City where my graduate university was stand in line, fill out paperwork and get my transcripts from that degree place to where I was trying to get a job and then I have to go back to Brooklyn and go to another school.

(06:50)

If I was lucky, I could make a phone call to the school in Colorado. I have credits from five different institutions of higher education and it was a herculean task to get paper with the imprinted seal on each one. What a stupid thing. The blockchain transcript solution is clearly where higher ed is going. Columbia University says, yes, he did it. Here's more detail. And I say, yes, I did. And that agreement is right there. So what does that mean in terms of underwriting risk, right? I am a person who has this capacity and someone else on the other side of a transaction says, yes, this person executed fairly and faithfully something they said I should do. Multiply that by a thousand transactions, you now have a risk profile of me. It's pretty valuable. And it's not owned by anyone. It's not a recommendation or a certification. It's a set of agreements that can become very, very large. And if you trust the blockchain that you're on, which is an interesting question, you will have a way of demonstrating agreement that can generate economic value, social value and trust. Think about that for the insurance business, economic value, social value and trust. Really, really good things. So the final thing I put on this slide is the best practices. Everything we do tries to point toward, okay, we've done the research, you've heard the stories, so what should we do? Number one, whichever side of a transaction you're on between a large insurance company or any kind of large operating company and a technology provider or technology advisor having one main relationship is dumb. We've worked with plenty of big companies where they say, we need our one partner for this new technology. We're going to do lots of research and we have to have someone close to us. They're going to know our secrets. We can't spread them too widely. That's not smart. You want to do, and I have the name McGrath there, what Rita Gunther McGrath advised brilliantly, I mentioned her book earlier, discovery driven growth. We love Rita. She's still out there kicking and advising companies. You have to create a portfolio that includes a lot of options. You never put a hundred percent or 50% of what you have to invest on the table in one bet. You make 10 bets at 10% and you buy the option to increase if it succeeds, right? You need that competition, you need it. We've lived through this as hiring managers. I hired five people. One I only hired because I needed someone. You seemed vaguely competent, man. Another one of those five, I fell in love. This guy is going to be the future. This guy is a loser. The one you thought was great is terrible, and the one you didn't really care about turns out to be the angel who you learn from. I mean, has that happened to you? It's happened to me many times. That's the portfolio model. You don't want to bet on just one. Ecosystems for task selection is really interesting. You want more partnerships that allow you to do what you're best at more often, both as an individual and as a company. You have really strong operating skills in this area, but you're merely adequate here. If you can be part of the partnerships where the mirror image, the other firms that are really good, where you're not and not where you are, you can create partnerships that drive more revenue, more economic value, more trust. So this is just a set of headlines. I'd love to hear from you in this fairly short session. This is our third of the day here and our last, what's most on your mind around these issues or related issues that we can speak to each other about? I'm going to add one thought. If you want to talk about the kind of more generic innovation best practices for large organizations. I have an endless supply of slides and stories, but that's up to you. I don't want to force that upon you. So I'm looking for a question or a concern.

Audience Member 1 (11:05):

One of the things that I always heard about blockchain was fascinating was that it's very good at handling information once it's on the chain, but actual getting the data to the chain is a challenge. So verifying that data that's written to the chain is the data I intended as your guide to the chain is sort of interesting when it comes to risk profiles because then I trust the user submitted.

Peter Temes (11:33):

So I think that's a great point. That gets me excited. How many of you have encountered blockchain in any operational way at all? You have no one else. Your firms have not used and you aren't doing any learning exercises or experiments. You probably should be because it's such a powerful technology and it's actually a kind of low tech tech. It's nothing like a large language model. You don't have to do the kinds of crazy training data, but it does require a certain amount of trust. It's like a convening point. It's a little bit like a society. So the first thing that I learned as I got serious about this is there's more than one blockchain. A lot of people do capital T, The blockchain, but there are different competing versions and I'm not an expert in that. I think there are some people in this room who are much more expert than I am who can talk about that if you're interested. But because what the blockchain is or I just did it because of what blockchains do and are in creating those agreements, they can be anonymous by using tokens. You can hold the token so no one on the blockchain knows your name, but if you've been paying attention to law enforcement, international law enforcement and cryptocurrency, the absolutely delightful just fact that there is no anonymity around a really fully functional blockchain. And this is around Bitcoin and some other cryptocurrencies. So here's what happened, and think about this from a risk perspective. From a risk underwriting perspective, let us say I am an absolutely monstrous drug dealer, criminal arms trader, bad, bad, bad, bad person. And I have oh, a hundred million bitcoins and I think the plural of Bitcoin is Bitcoin. Is that right? Somebody? Yeah. I have a hundred million Bitcoin worth a billion and a half dollars and that math is wrong certainly, but a lot of money and I have a wallet that has a really complex code and have you seen the stories? Some 29 year old sent a millionaire, wakes up in Belize after a really cool party, he's on the beach and then suddenly he says, I forgot my code from my Bitcoin wallet. And it's like without the code you can't get it back. That's interesting. More interesting is that one reason you can't get it back is it's supposedly totally anonymous. And yet once the chain is populated enough, once we can start doing correlations, if you pay your phone bill, if you shop online, if your mother mentioned your name on Facebook next to your picture, there are enough points of data about you that we can correlate to things we know about who did a transaction on a blockchain that you will be found out. That's interesting. So for the first few years of the Bitcoin blockchain, it was functionally anonymous and lots of bad business was funded through that, and today it is functionally zero anonymity, probably not zero, but close to zero because we've really dialed in how to correlate in the same way, if you do any data analytics in your firm at a high level, how you correlate someone who does this with someone who does a lot of other things and with each separate data point, we get closer to who you are. And there are so many more data points today for every one of us. I think it's good because I don't like the idea that this new technology has been funding trafficking for sexual purposes, the movement of guns. And in fact, we did a project or an article for one of the insurance magazines. It was really interesting about disappearing cargo and anybody here a fan of the TV show The Wire? Yeah, I still think the best television show ever, it was described by someone as being like a Scorsese film, but a hundred hours long. So that could be a good thing or a bad thing depending on your taste and your time. It used to be that cargo disappeared from docks, right? Especially North America and Europe. I mean the dock workers, can you picture the old image of what a dock worker was? They had these metal hooks, right? A piece of wood like this with a big metal hook with a sharp point on it and cargo was moved mostly in cargo nets. You'd have piles and piles of stuff in the holds of ships and these burly men would jump in the hole and throw it into nets and then you'd grab it the net with the hook. The hook would be the whole thing would be hoisted up and half the stuff, a third of the stuff, 10% of the stuff wouldn't get there. And over time, people who were shipping knew they had to negotiate, they had to negotiate with the union, they had to negotiate with whatever crime group ran the docks, and often they overlapped a lot and you just made your peace with it. It was the cost of doing business. That does not happen anymore in modern ports, right? The quote containerization of freight and then what we've been seeing a lot of, we're only about 20% there, but every container has tracking devices in it. They all have unique signatures. It's almost impossible to steal a container. What you can steal is a whole ship. So you see these ships with a thousand containers and they go dark, they're out in international orders, maybe they have Liberian flags and what that means is they're officially registered from the port, a national port in Liberia, which is a country with a collapsed government and you can track every ship. I mean they're all equipped. And then it's stopped and then for a week it's gone and then it's back, except it has no cargo on where was it plausibly, North Korea. I mean that's a good one, Iran, right? Rogue nations. What you're seeing is the technology in some ways is raising the stakes net. It's a more transparent system in the same way that a non-cash economy has less room for graft unless you are the big grafter, unless you can sell an interest in the whole system, unless you can do, you could do theft not by grabbing from someone, but by pretending to be someone else by locking people in or out of whole economies. This is a really interesting challenge for how to underwrite risk, particularly if we're more and more global. And I think if you're doing something as simple as commercial insurance or around online transactions, and I think many of the firms around here have a little finger in that, you see where new kinds of fraud is coming from and what consumer fraud is pulling out from the pockets of Americans, not by reaching in physically, but by spoofing and faking and creating buckets where people put their money willingly. Sometimes even to the point that a crime hasn't been committed, they're just kind of arbitraging people's inability to know what's, which is why we're probably moving in a direction where most transactions, more than a certain dollar amount will have a blockchain record that will remove some of that nasty behavior. But we all have to be willing to give up some privacy for that to happen. So let me take a step back because going kind of deep on some of this question for you, two questions for you. Number one, do you want to talk about some specific issues around digital insurance that you've brought into the room? Would you like to talk about some of the more structural elements of how innovation can work best inside large organizations? Would you like we'll make it an option of option set of three. Would you like to talk about the best ways for smaller tech oriented companies to partner with bigger operating companies?

Audience Member 3 (19:50):

I'll go with option three.

Peter Temes (19:50):

Option three, okay. How many people here are working for a publicly traded company? How many people are working for a company with under a hundred employees? Yeah, I'll raise my hand for that one. Yeah, really interesting. I mentioned at our first session today that when we started this organization in 2005 working with Clayton Christensen, one of the questions people brought into the room, often senior VP plus people from really big companies, they would walk in and say, we're here for the innovation conversation. How can the big incumbent company be more like a startup? How can we act like we're operating in a garage even though we own the whole tower on Park Avenue? And the answer was dumb question, not a smart question to ask. And what's changed since the bigger companies that we work with now, almost all of them have figured out the right question is how can we as a big company do what only we can do because big and have the right kinds of partnerships and engagements with the little companies so they can do what they can do, they move fast and there are good repositories of risk. There is this idea of externalizing risk in the drug company space. It's really, really clear. Most big drug companies don't do fundamental research around molecules anymore. They only bring in that work once it's reached a certain threshold of value. So if you want to develop a new drug from scratch, you're likely at a university or you are in a pharma investor funded startup. So Merck will send 25 million to a room full of scientists who are doing that early work and that little company is not going to get sued. Nobody knows they're there. If Merck were doing that development, they would be sued on day one. There's a pharma plaintiff's bar. All they do all day is go after these big guys. Sometimes they're right. I think more often than not they're wrong, but that doesn't matter. The little high risk period has to be externalized. Only then when something reaches past a threshold of value, do they fully acquire and usually it's exercising an option to acquire that they've got. Does that work in the insurance business? Maybe. Maybe not, right? You remember during the global financial crisis, the idea of creating a bad bank was floated. I can, and just the footnote to that is the bad bank is okay, we have a hundred billion in assets. Oh, 40 billion of it is not only not collectible, it's got all kinds of liability with it. So we'll just split it into two pieces and put the bad stuff in the bad bank. An interesting thing about bad banks, they tend to be very profitable in the short run. Whatever reason you accumulated those bad assets probably had something to do with short term return and the bad bank is not a zero sum proposition to investors. There are people who want to invest in it. What we are beginning to see now are some bad insurance companies, particularly around reinsurance, particularly in the energy space, and I will tell you so I'm not going to name them, they're a former member of ours, really big reinsurer, and many of these firms, especially many that do business in Europe, they have a new policy that's already in force. We will not underwrite natural gas or oil pipelines. Too much harm, can't do it. And even as part of this new debt deal, the revivification of a big oil pipeline, it might not get built because the cost of to insured is so high because most of the big players don't want to play there anymore. And it's like, well wait a minute. If the cost to insured is really high, if it's as high as it possibly can be and still get paid, it's going to be a big margin there because there's a political cost that a rogue player doesn't care about. So the purchaser of the insurance is going to pay a premium because it's and potentially has compliance issues, but if you don't care, you keep the premium and you give them real insurance, your financial risk is still relatively low. You make a lot of money. We are seeing that. We're even seeing that almost in a kind of captive version, an underwriter who makes a lot of money, a rockstar underwriter in one of these really big global reinsurance firms. I was on the phone last month, the firm's new policies, we don't underwrite oil and gas pipelines, and he was like, man, I'm making so much money underwriting oil and gas pipeline. I was like, how do you, they not know. It's like, I don't know, but the premiums are higher. It's not. And he said, it's not going to be there in five years, but the next five years he's going to make a lot of money. This is an interesting internal case and there's much to say about that. But even if it's happening more openly without people breaking the laws of their own firms, this idea that we're going to have certain assets, certain traders that do stuff that the mainstream doesn't want to do is something that's predictable and I think actually something that's manageable. The question is, are we willing as investors to invest if the ESG cost is too high and do we actually believe that it's wrong or bad? And that's a serious question about underwriting risk. There's certain kinds of bad behavior that doesn't happen if you don't have a risk underwriter for it, and there's certain kinds of behavior that's virtuous that only happens if you have a risk underwriter for it. Do you take that into account in what you do when you sell software that counts money? Do you want to count anybody's money? Do you care that it's cleaner money or dirtier money? I can tell you that we took a membership fee. I'll tell you two stories. One was a yes and one was a no. So we had the chief marketing officer from Philip Morris more than 10 years ago at our table in New York, and my view is 50 people around a table. The conversation is important. We hadn't taken any money from her and I want to hear what she has to say. Everyone deserves the chance to speak good conversation. She introduced herself by saying, I'm so and so. Chief marketing officer for Philip Morris. My number one job is to reduce the harm our products do. Like, wow, that's awesome. And then she said she'd like to pay us money to join, and I said, yes, I accept. And if it turns out to be true, we'd like to help you reduce the harm your products do, and it was not true. Zero participation. I believe that they paid that money simply so they could be part of a mainstream group of mainstream companies and not lose that part of their identity. I also got a call from a company called The Geo Group. Anybody know The Geo Group? They are private operators of federal prisons and detention facilities, and I've encountered them. There's one not far from my home in Seattle in Tacoma, which is an ice facility detention of not just people who are here illegally detention of people waiting for decisions who are legally here as asylum seekers. And it's terrible. It's an ugly, ugly business. The guy I spoke to was lovely, ready to give us a big bucket full of money and I didn't want to take it. I really think what they do is wrong, and I don't think he's a bad guy, but what I told him was, I feel like the incentives are wrong in your sector. You benefit when more people guilty or innocent are being detained and held in prison by my government. And I think that inevitably causes bad things to happen. And he was telling me about all the cool entrepreneurship and private sector stuff they were doing that was really socially good. I said, great, listen, I'll do anything to help you. Put me on an advisory board, give me a project, but the only thing I won't do is take your money. And I never heard from him again. I was like, Yeah. This idea that being in the mainstream has economic value I think is important as technology continues to develop in the insurance sector because being bonded, being insured is a thing of value. This is one of the reasons why that cyber insurance example I think is so interesting, right? So HCC, which is now owned by Tokyo Marine, which I think used to be Houston Casualty Corp, asked us about 10 years ago to look to do like a study should they or should they not be in the cyber insurance business? Meaning underwrite the risk from data breaches website, bad behavior intrusions for big operating companies around what they do online. And we did the research and we weren't particularly asked for a recommendation, but it was really clear you shouldn't because there's not real meaningful value that you can deliver. What you can is satisfy a regulatory or a board requirement that you have cyber insurance, but nobody had payout limits within reason that could match the real liability of these big publicly traded companies. It similar, I said this earlier, some of you were here, it was like getting health insurance that has a $20,000 deductible. I mean, you're probably completely uninsured for all intents and purposes, but you can check the box that you have health insurance, and they did not go into the business full on, but they went into the business a little bit. It's hard to know how to price something which is more cosmetic in its value. I mean, how do you price a medical insurance policy with a $20,000 deductible? You'd think it'd be a really low price. In fact, it's often not because people have a reason other than actual value to need to hold that insurance. So if you can test that price, you can find out what it's really worth to them. So these are challenges. That gets to a final thought on this dimension of conversation about where we're going with technology and here it is, do you really want to be completely meritocratic? Do you want to ensure people who are only good risks? Do you only want to buy insurance? That gives you real value? If you can tell as an employer who is actually worth 10 times more than their peers, do you want to pay that person five or 10 times more? The data can tell us a lot of this today, do we want to know what are the dangers of knowing Microsoft has a really, really robust backend analytics system. If your company has a Microsoft Productivity desktop license, which you know many do for a hundred thousand people, 200,000 people, it knows things about all your people. It knows what a lot of them are good at and bad at because it's seeing how they type. It's looking at their spreadsheets, it's looking at their email. It's especially good at knowing who's influential in certain areas and who's not. Who has the kinds of emailing history with other people who have become higher value because of those connections. Do you want to know that? For the most part, Microsoft does not even internally, right? With 200,000 employees or so who are doing that work, who are feeding that backend because there's tons of litigation risk, but more than that, it's a violation of an implicit social contract. I did talk to someone who works in the CEO's office at Microsoft just two weeks ago for a research project, and one of the questions we were doing to benchmark some big innovation groups and big companies was how do you form teams?

(31:26)

How do you know who to recruit internally or externally to be on a team that's going to run some innovation programs? And he was talking about how they did their internal recruiting, and I just said to him, do you use the backend analytics function that you have? And he said, we do. He's the first person at Microsoft who gave me that answer. I've asked that question a lot. He said, we do, but it's more of a general hint. It'll give me a list of 10 and then I have to look at them carefully and one or two out of the 10 will be the right people. But man, I thought that was really interesting and I think we're heading to do more of that. Do we want that? Do we want people who are bad drivers to never be able to get insurance? Do we want someone who through no fault of their own is going to cost all of us tons of money if we give them health insurance? Do we want to give that person health insurance? I mean, these are questions that we were able to blink at a little bit more that we can't, as much as data really starts doing what it can do to move from the demographic of a whole category by gender or race or education to a category of one, now you really know who I am. I'm a 57 year old male with no criminal record that tells you something about risk for me, and I'm also overweight and undisciplined in certain ways and cranky, and I've never been able to keep a job that wasn't in a company I started for more than three years. Oh, do you want to know those things or do you just want to put a finger on the scale so that we have a more functional, equitable society? I shouldn't say equitable, a more functional seemingly equalitarian society because equitable might mean equity, right? Fairness. And we have not yet figured out what that fairness means. This is a very big issue for chat GPT and these other emerging AI systems. These systems will do what we ask them to do. What should we not ask them to do? Because it's harmful. This is a kind of full employment act for philosophy majors, and I still think we're doing too little of it, but more of it, which is good. So let me stop talking there. Comments, questions, thoughts? Yes.

Audience Member 1 (33:46):

This brings up to me the whole moral issue. Insurance are right criminals. This insurance are right. As a homeowner in California, we see this going on. I don't live on the edge of the ocean. I don't live on the middle of a mountain just burned, but even so on the edge where I live. My insurance carrier just pulled out of the state.

Peter Temes (34:09):

Right.

Audience Member 1 (34:10):

So it goes back to your do you, aren't there other insurance? We don't see other insurance companies coming in to fill that void. Farmers pulled Out, nest farm, pulled out on wait till next May, but what happens? right. You go to last, whatever we call the right, which will cost five or six x what I pay now. So it's an interesting question.

Peter Temes (34:34):

Yeah.

Audience Member 1 (34:37):

Insurance Is a right for people.

Peter Temes (34:38):

Right.

Audience Member 1 (34:39):

For people like health insurance is a right.

Peter Temes (34:41):

Well, let's go back to the bigger question of whether there's a right to have a home, which is a very poignant alive question right now in this country, if you believe there's a right to have a home, but some home, any home, you might believe that if you own a home privately, insurance ought to be provided. But then the question is what non-market engine is deciding what that home is worth and what we collectively can lose so you can keep it. So let's say hypothetically the yes, there are insurers of last resort that cost a lot of money, but here's a real free market test of whether that insurance is a good idea. Hypothetically, let's say your house is worth $2 million, right? Nice big house in or modest small house in California, 2 million bucks and you get 10 neighbors. Can the 10 of you collectively backstop each other with some kind of insurance like facility to the point that you'll feel comfortable enough to keep going once you're really bearing the full cost for each other's risk? You'll know whether it's a fair price. I mean, if I take a hundred homes, let's say it's funny, I live in a funny little neighborhood in Seattle. Nice house is 48 homes in our geographically distinct little area, and it's not a gated community. It just happens to be, there's a road here and a road there. There's one street. I have a great view of the water in the city and my house is one of the oldest ones, and then there's a street over here that's blocking half my view. And the joke for the people on my side of the street is I hope nobody's home when the next earthquake comes. I hope none of them are home. We love them, but then all the houses fall down and we'll get our view back. Would the 48 of us in our neighborhood feel that the relative risk is good enough that we could just ensure each other? I think yes, we have a higher than average earthquake risk, lower than average crime. The climate is not an extreme climate that threatens us. Seattle is city of the climate change, city of the future. It's going to get sunnier and warmer and it's still nice. Yeah, I would go for that. I would invest in the collective risk profile of that community. However, if I would say it's too much of a risk because I know how high the risk is for my neighbor's house to have something terrible happen to it, I think I'm making a market driven reasonable choice that answers the question. I don't think there's a right to destroy other people's property or value. And if ultimately you have to take doing a classic actuarial analysis from other people to keep your house, I don't think there's a right to have it insured. That's my personal view. And apparently I've just said it on a recorded mic, so now the world will know, but this is exactly the kind of question we're going to be wrestling with then. And then you have the question of how that threads through tight. I don't think you would have a right If your home becomes uninsurable and to some degree uninhabitable, I don't think you'd have a right to force me to underwrite that risk forever. I do think putting aside right, I have a collective interest in backstopping you for a one-time transition. I think not having someone, not having many people lose their homes is just good for society. It keeps the stock market up. It keeps the sense of social trust alive that we need to have a decent civic life. And there are calculations like that I think we can make also. And I guess my final question is how much are those calculations alive in your companies? I mean, the cliche in Silicon Valley is we're going to make the world better by doing X mean. One of the reasons it's a cliche is people really like hearing it and they really like feeling it. And best of all, they like it to be true. I hope that the revolution in data, the revolution in communications that we're right in the middle of helps make all that more true. I think it already is a little bit when you look at generational difference and the idea that you need to have a social mission and you need to recognize the community of people in a firm as a real community that is more alive today than it was 10 years ago. And I think that's a net. Good. Yeah. I think we're out of time. Yeah, we have one minute left. I'm not going to say encouraged. You've indulged me to do most of the speaking here. I don't know that that was the plan, but I've enjoyed it. Thank you for being with us as a group. I hope I'll see all of you again in different times and places. Look up my organization if you would, the Institute for Innovation in large organizations. We have a lot of activities that you might want to play some part in. And you've got, I should've put my name on the slide, Peter Temes. Please connect with me on LinkedIn or otherwise engage. I feel like this was time well spent for me. I hope you feel the same way.