Lone Offenders Pose Unique Terrorism Risks

Western government intelligence operations report learning much since 9/11, and have since thwarted a number of macro terrorism attacks planned by right-wing extremists. Yet an ongoing concern to the FBI is the lone offender: ‘a single individual driven to hateful attacks based on a particular set of beliefs without a larger group’s knowledge or support.’

According to risk modeler RMS, the FBI believes that most U.S. domestic attacks are carried out by lone offenders to promote their own grievances and agendas.

Catching lone wolf terrorists is a huge challenge even in western countries with the most effective and well-resourced counter-terrorism services, however, RMS says that with a minimal social network of plotters, the chance may only be one in four. Accordingly, in February 2010, CIA Director Leon Panetta reckoned the lone wolf strategy to be the main terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland.

“In a small outlying, peaceful country such as Norway, where the authorities ranked the terrorist threat as low, and dismissed right-wing extremism as not a serious threat, there would only have been a very slim chance of stopping a lone wolf terrorist through intelligence gathering,” said Dr. Gordon Woo, catastrophist at RMS.

When a lone wolf manages to evade detection by the intelligence services, the amount of harm he/she could cause depends critically on security levels around the terrorism target.

For example, RMS points to Norway where, as a nation priding itself as an open society, the level of urban security has been kept purposely low. In contrast with Downing Street or the White House, the Norwegian Prime Minister’s office was publicly accessible with minimal ID and no baggage checks. Press reports hold that a plan to construct barriers protecting the central complex of government buildings was due to be implemented in a few months’ time, after a decade of post-9/11 procrastination.

The price for such societal openness was paid on Friday, July 22 of this year, when a major terrorist attack was mounted against the ruling Labour party of Norway by a right-wing extremist Islamophobe Anders Behring Breivik. An admitted lone wolf, it is possible he may have had a limited degree of plot assistance, notes RMS.

“The large scale of Breivik’s successful attack was made possible by the general lack of terrorism risk awareness of a country without any notable terrorism experience within its own borders,” continued Dr. Woo. “The Norwegian government tolerated outspoken anti-American diatribes of Mullah Krekar, head of Ansar-al-Islam, who claimed he was an insurance policy against Islamist attacks in Norway. Additionally, few rather minor Jihadi incidents have occurred, such as the firing of gunshots in the Oslo synagogue in 2006; the arrest in 2008 of Somalis for terrorist fundraising on behalf of Al Shabab; and the arrest in 2010 of three Norwegian residents with Al Qaeda links.”

Insurers evaluating terrorism risk management may note similarities between lone wolf behaviors. In Norway, preparations for an attack were conducted patiently by an ethnic Norwegian without interference or obstruction from the authorities, or tip-offs from vigilant fellow citizens. Similar to the lone wolf American Unabomber, the educated Breivik wrote his own lengthy rambling political manifesto; however, unlike the ramblings of the Unabomber, Breivik put careful thought and systematic scheduling into the meticulous planning of his terrorism plot. Detracting attention, the bomb attack in Oslo drew in police resources, which facilitated Breivik’s subsequent assault on the Labour party youth summer camp on the island of Utoeya.

RMS notes that for a home-grown right-wing terrorist intent on perpetrating a spectacular domestic attack, Norway was an ideal safe haven, just as Afghanistan was for Al Qaeda before 9/11. For example, there were no constraints or ID checks against the procurement of 6 tons of artificial fertilizer from an agricultural supply company. Half of this quantity was found at Breivik’s farm. Allowing for some proper agricultural usage, and some for bomb testing, he might have packed as much as two tons into the delivery van that was parked close to the energy ministry.

In the past, similar behaviors attempted in dissimilar cultures were met with public alarm and a preempt of terrorism strikes. For example, in the more terror-prone United States or the principal countries of Western Europe, acquiring several tons of fertilizer attracts the attention of security personnel or suspicion of citizens. In 2004, five terrorists were caught in the U.K. stockpiling a ton of fertilizer and planning bombing raids. The U.K. authorities noted that the large quantity of fertilizer purchased for supposedly garden purposes, as well as its prolonged storage, raised flags among citizens and the authorities, thereby thwarting potential acts of terrorism.

Dr. Magnus Ranstorp, one of RMS’ longstanding terrorist expert advisers, notes that in the wake of the Oslo attacks, counter-terrorism intelligence services across Europe were rightly concerned about the lone wolf and will now try to obtain as much information as possible from their Norwegian counterparts.

In a special report issued by RMS, the company notes that the threat of terrorist attacks will continue to pose a major risk to the insurance industry in the near future, and describes a terrorism landscape that is changing.

RMS, which recently introduced a new version of its terrorism risk model, advises all stakeholders to draw lessons from Oslo on the capability of lone wolves and to compare these lessons to the much tougher counter-terrorism environment in western democracies, such as U.S., U.K., France and Germany, which have already experienced violent terrorist threats, and responded accordingly by strengthening defensive measures.

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